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Abstract: Transnational European party federations – ‘Europarties’ – are an overlooked actor of
EU external  relations despite their  strong footprint outside the EU. This article  discusses the
activities of Europarties as networks of EU external relations closely aligned with the interests
and values of EU foreign policy,  but conditioned by their  character  as transnational  partisan
actors with distinct priorities defined by ideological affinity and political commitments to partner
parties. Empirically, the article investigates the activities of the centre-right European People’s
Party  (EPP)  in  Georgia  and  North  Macedonia,  demonstrating  how  Europarties  can  act  as
amplifiers of EU influence in Eastern Europe and Western Balkans, but also how their partisan
interests  often come into tension with EU priorities.  The findings  carry implications  for the
theory and practice of EU relations with its neighbourhood at a time when prospects for further
enlargement appear significantly weakened.
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Introduction
The external relations of the EU are today a dense and multi-layered field where a growing
variety of EU actors engages a rising number of stakeholders in neighbouring countries. Even
actors associated mostly with the EU’s internal governance like the European Parliament have
attracted attention for their role in EU foreign and neighbourhood policy (Nitoiu and Sus, 2017;
Rosen  and  Raube,  2018).  Yet  an  increasingly  assertive  actor  both  in  the  EU’s  internal
governance and its external relations has received scant attention: the transnational political party
federations more commonly known as ‘Europarties’.
This omission is understandable to the extent that transnational party politics have received
little research interest (see indicatively Bardi and Calossi, 2009; Bressanelli, 2014; Hix and Lord,
1997; Van Hecke, 2010). But it is still a significant gap since transnational party politics has
always  formed  an  important  aspect  of  relations  between  the  EU  and  neighbouring  states.
European party federations have historically maintained contacts with parties outside of the EU.
And with the EU’s enlargement  appetite  seemingly exhausted,  Europarties’ ability to engage
political actors in post-Soviet and Balkan states must be seen in a new light as the EU tries to
maintain influence there. 
The  question  then  is  twofold:  What  is  the  role  of  Europarties  as  actors  of  EU external
relations today? And how do their activities relate to more specific objectives of EU foreign, and
particularly enlargement and neighbourhood, policy? This article aims to answer these questions
by conceptualizing Europarties as networks of external EU governance of a partisan-ideological
character. The core insight is that, while Europarties contribute to the EU’s goal to strategically
bind neighbouring states and foster transformation of their societies, contradictions often emerge.
Europarties’ external activities are conditioned by their commitment to the goals of EU foreign
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policy. But they are also informed by the logic of partisan allegiance, ideological affinity and
electoral gains; indeed, this is why they are able to attract and influence external partisan actors. 
In other words, if Europarties’ external activities as networks of EU governance can be seen
as the pursuit  of EU foreign policy goals by partisan-ideological  means,  Europarties still  are
conscious actors for whom EU foreign policy is a field for promotion of their own goals. The
implication for EU foreign policy is that the involvement of more actors creates new ways for the
EU to exert influence abroad, but also complicates its conduct as different political priorities and
logics of transnational action contrast conventional diplomatic tools.
The article  proceeds as follows: first,  it  presents the external and internal  context  of EU
politics  that  has  raised  the  importance  of  Europarties;  second,  it  develops  the  concept  of
partisan-ideological network of external governance to understand Europarties as external actors
whose activities both underpin and cut across EU goals in the neighbourhood; third, it applies
this framework to the activities of the centre-right European People’s Party in Georgia and North
Macedonia, focusing on recent political crises that created opportunities for the EPP to act as
conduit  of EU influence and created tensions between the EPP’s objectives and some of the
immediate  priorities  of  the  EU;  fourth,  it  concludes  by  discussing  the  implications  of  the
analysis.
Europarties: Networks of External EU Governance of a Partisan-Ideological Character
The Context: The EU and the Neighbourhood in a Post-Enlargement (?) Era
To understand the role of Europarties in the EU’s external relations, it is important first to
assess the context within which they operate, particularly with regards to the EU enlargement
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and neighbourhood policy (ENP). While until 2004 the EU’s engagement with its immediate
neighbourhood took place through the lens of prospective accession of these states, since then
the enlarged EU is facing a much more complex environment with the states bordering it. 
The straightforward prospect of enlargement meant that the EU cpuld influence the post-
communist states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to adopt political and economic reforms.
Yet the enlargement perspective is either lacking or weakened vis-à-vis the two neighbouring
groupings of the EU: the six post-Soviet states comprising the Eastern Partnership (EaP) for
whom no enlargement promise has been made; and the six states of the Western Balkans where a
formal accession prospect exists but the EU appears very lacklustre to act upon it. This uncertain
or  absent  promise  of  enlargement  weakens  the  EU’s  ability  to  enforce  conditionality  in  its
relationship  with  these  countries  (Nitoiu,  2017:  89;  Schimmelfennig  and  Scholtz,  2008).
Adapting to the EU acquis entails costs for elites that have long benefited from captured states.
Without the prospect of EU accession and its rewards, these elites have little incentive to adopt
EU rules (Börzel et al, 2017).
In light of this, the EU has explored other ways to exert influence in neighbouring countries.
One is to foster societal linkage with these countries’ citizens and transformation from below as
EU values spread among societies and generate pressure on states and elites to align with the EU
(Bosse and Korosteleva-Polglasse, 2009). But civil society in Eastern Europe and the Western
Balkans is weak and fragmented, and local elites have the capacity to manipulate it and remain
sheltered from its demands (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2011). The EU has also pursued
external  governance  promotion as  a  substitute  for  the  more  formal  enlargement  process,
establishing networks of experts between the EU and the administration of neighbouring states in
order to facilitate the transference of policy practices and norms (Lavenex, 2008; Nitoiu, 2017:
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91). Despite an intensification of this method of external engagement, the problems are the same
as with societal linkage: the prevalence of oligarchic politics and the weakness of administrative
structures (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2011: 896-897).
At  the  same time,  the  EU must  engage with  its  neighbourhood at  a  high  political  level
(Nitoiu, 2017: 92). Its EaP framework has always had a geopolitical undercurrent, since the aim
to embed post-Soviet states in its framework of rules and norms means pulling them from the
Russian  orbit  (Nitoiu  and  Sus,  2017:  74).  The  EU’s  normative  and  geopolitical  goals  are
entwined (Youngs, 2009: 900). In the Western Balkans on the other hand the EU may have an
enlargement  agenda,  but  its  progress  is  hampered  by legacies  of  nationalism,  including  the
Serbia-Kosovo tensions and ethnic divisions in Bosnia (Stojić, 2017). Thus, in approaching its
neighbourhood the EU must also engage with geopolitical challenges, something that does not
always sit easily with the bureaucratic character of its enlargement and neighbourhood policy
(Lehne, 2014)
Europarties in EU Politics
The importance of transnational party politics in the EU has only increased in recent years.
Dynamics of integration since Maastricht, accentuated by enlargement and the governance crises
of 2010-15 that deepened rifts between member-states, has made trans- and inter-governmental
modes of policymaking a dominant feature of the EU modus operandi (Bickerton et al, 2015).
By operating on the intersection of intergovernmental and transnational politics (Van Hecke,
2010),  transnational  party  federations  are  of  obvious  importance.  More  practically,  the
Spitzenkandidat process, whereby since 2014 Europarties put forward candidates for the post of
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Commission  president  ahead  of  European  elections,  has  further  strengthened  their  role
(Christiansen, 2016).
Even  though  the  notion  of  Europarty  is  often  used  in  an  abstract  and  conflated  way,
sometimes as a byword for ‘political family’ and ideological affinity across borders, Europarties
as such have a distinct corporate identity from other partisan actors of the EU political system
like European Parliament groups (Hix and Lord, 1997). Europarties are entities based in Brussels
(Lightfoot, 2006). The main ones are the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), the centre-
left Party of European Socialists (PES), and the centrist Renew Europe, known until 2019 as
Alliance  of  Liberals  and  Democrats  (ALDE).  Far  from being  genuine  supranational  parties
(Bardi and Calossi, 2009), Europarties are in practice little more than secretariats tasked with
representing their member-parties in Brussels, facilitating co-operation (Zur Hausen, 2008) and
coordinating EU election campaigns (Gagatek, 2010).
Given that even the biggest Europarties have far fewer resources than even their smallest
member-parties and they also lack a mass direct membership (although see Hertner, 2018), they
can be understood first and foremost as agents of national political parties (Bardi and Calossi,
2009). Thus, their standing hinges primarily on them delivering coordinating and information-
sharing services to their membership. Indeed, Europarties organise meetings of member-party
actors and of national ministers belonging to their member-parties ahead of Council sessions, and
summits of member-party leaders ahead of European Council meetings. Europarty activities are
valuable for member-parties that are not in government in their home country, as politicians in
opposition  gain  proximity  to  the  policymaking  process  in  Brussels  and  information  about
developments in various policy dossiers (Chryssogelos, 2017: 258-259). 
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Yet these skeletal secretariats in Brussels are also actors in their own right. They are led by
politicians, often of high profile (e.g. ex-prime ministers like the EPP’s current president Donald
Tusk),  who  are  keen  to  play  an  important  role  in  EU politics.  They  are  staffed  by  policy
professionals  aiming  to  make  a  mark  in  Brussels  and use  this  as  an  entry  point  for  career
opportunities  in  or  around  EU institutions.  Also,  not  to  be  underestimated  is  the  ideational
underpinning of Europarty officials, most of whom sincerely seek to infuse European integration
with a specific ideological flavour. In all these ways, Europarties are not only reflections of the
interests of their member-parties but actors with a non-negligible degree of agency in their own
right,  motivated  by their  desire  to  increase  their  influence  and visibility  in  the  EU political
system (Chryssogelos, 2017: 262).
At the same time, Europarties relate with an array of other actors in the EU. Most obviously,
Europarties are in a close relationship with their equivalent European Parliament groups that are
themselves  an  arena  of  competition  between  national  member-parties  for  political  and
programmatic influence (Klüver and Rodon, 2013) and, hence, crystallization of Europarties’
transnational ideological profile (Bressanelli, 2014). MEPs often occupy positions in Europarty
organs, including even the position of Europarty president (as with Joseph Daul as head of the
EPP). Beyond the Parliament, Europarty affiliates populate all other major EU institutions. The
president and members of the EU Commission of course, but since 2009 also the president of the
European Council and since 2019 even the president of the ECB, are all appointed on the basis of
their  partisan  allegiance.  These  actors  now  casually  attend  summits,  events  and  seminars
organized by Europarties.
In this expanded sense, Europarty secretariats are also hubs of networks of EU governance.
This brings the study of Europarties close to the governance approach of EU politics, whereby
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the formal intergovernmental and supranational modes of policymaking are traversed by policy
networks where information,  influence  and expertise  are exchanged (see indicatively Börzel,
2010; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006). While the governance approach has focused primarily
on networks of technical, epistemic or bureaucratic character, the study of Europarties reveals
the importance of partisan allegiance and ideological like-mindedness as a feature around which
networks running through EU institutions and national political arenas can also coalesce.
Conceptualizing the Actorness of Europarties in EU External Relations
The above examination of the nature of Europarties in the EU political system provides hints
as to their actorness in EU external relations. It is important to remember that Europarties have
always had an external aspect in their activities. In the 1990s, they sought partners in CEE and
this (fore)shadowed the dynamics of enlargement conditionality (Klápácová, 2013). Just as the
EU  aimed  to  reform  enlargement  countries,  Europarties  socialised  party  elites  in  European
norms, helped partner parties consolidate their ideological profile (von dem Berge, 2017) and
urged  them  to  stay  on  the  pro-European  path.  Thus,  transnational  party  politics  were  an
additional  avenue  for  EU  influence  on  candidate  states  (Pridham,  2014;  Vachudova,  2008)
because elites in candidate countries valued the benefits of association with them (international
exposure and domestic credibility, policy cooperation, campaign assistance) (Klápácová, 2013).
In a post-enlargement context, expansion beyond the EU has been a way for Europarties to
increase their  collective influence within the EU political  system, while also competing with
each  other  for  attention  in  Brussels1.  For  politicians  in  post-Soviet  Europe and the  Western
Balkans on the other hand, association with Europarties is one of the few opportunities to engage
with  EU  leaders,  voice  their  interests  and  draw  political  capital  from  their  contacts  with
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European politicians2.  For elites from countries whose relations with the EU run through the
largely bureaucratic framework of enlargement and neighbourhood policy (Nitoiu,  2017: 91),
Europarty events are precious opportunities to engage with the EU on a high-political level3. 
Thus, the relationship between Europarties and affiliated parties in the neighbourhood is to a
significant degree reversed compared to the one with their member-parties from inside the EU
that remain to a large extent their principals (Bardi and Calossi, 2009). This allows Europarties
to act as conduits for the EU’s goals in the neighbourhood and claim a role in EU foreign policy.
The EU wants to induce political elites in the Western Balkans to resolve pending ethnic disputes
and to keep EaP states away from the Russian orbit. Pressure towards these goals in Europarty
forums and summits can be an additional tool to influence political developments, as elites from
the  neighbourhood  value  the  benefits  they  accrue  by  satisfying  their  partners  in  Brussels4.
Europarties  are  also  sources  of  information  on  foreign  affairs  for  affiliated  politicians  and
policymakers in EU institutions (see also Nitoiu and Sus, 2017: 84; Rosen and Raube, 2018:
80)5. 
Most contemporary literature on EU neighbourhood policy is explicitly pessimistic about the
prospects  of  the  EU inducing domestic  change in  the  Western  Balkans  and Eastern  Europe
without  the  promise  of  enlargement  (Börzel  et  al,  2017;  Richter  and Wunsch,  2020).  Stojić
(2017: 220-221) has found that Europarty influence over the strategic decisions of their member-
parties in the Balkans is limited,  while Shagina (2017) is quite sceptical whether Europarties
contribute  to  transference  of  norms  and  practices  of  democratic  party  politics  in  Ukraine.
Whether  Europarties  strengthen  democracy  at  all  is  even  put  into  question  regarding  EU
members like Hungary (Kelemen, 2017; Meijers and van der Veer, 2019), which in turn relates
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to critical views of EU influence on democracy and rule of law in the neighbourhood (Richter
and Wunsch, 2020).
Valid as these concerns are, a more complete view of Europarty agency beyond the control of
their member-parties and their multifaceted activities as political networks showcases aspects of
their role that mostly remain underappreciated. Thus, the conditionality they apply on affiliated
parties that crave for Europarty association can be an important substitute for EU leverage in the
neighbourhood  (Chryssogelos,  2017:  262-264;  Vachudova,  2014).  Europarties  expect  their
associated parties to display at least some ideological congruence with their values, have internal
structures  that  are  reasonably  open  and  democratic  (von  dem  Berge,  2017),  as  well  as  be
(relatively)  free of  association  with major  corruption  charges.  Most  importantly,  Europarties
expect associated parties to unequivocally commit to their countries’ EU perspective6. Failure of
associate parties in the neighbourhood on one or more of these fronts has led in the past to their
sanction and even expulsion from Europarties.
It is also important to note that, next to their self-interested goals (namely, to increase their
visibility and influence), Europarties have ideational objectives. As EU actors, they identify with
the interests of the EU in international affairs, while as partisan-ideological actors they aim to
formulate distinct programmatic positions on EU external relations (Chryssogelos, 2015). In both
senses, Europarties use their affiliation with parties in the neighbourhood as a tool to bring about
specific foreign policy outcomes: further EU goals in the region and, within this framework,
support likeminded partners and promote priorities specific to their ideological identity. 
In order to make sense of the actorness of Europarties in EU external relations that reflects
their multifaceted nature – umbrellas of national parties, distinct actors with their own corporate
identity and interests, hubs of networks of governance – I propose to combine two conceptual
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perspectives. The first is  the concept of  transnational actors as developed in the transnational
relations literature to capture Europarties’ role as distinct actors in their own right. The interest in
transnational actors after the end of the Cold War arose from the awareness that non-state actors
have the ability, flexibility and ideational acumen to pursue international goals and effect change
by propagating new ideas or expertise across official  jurisdictions. (Evangelista,  1995; Risse-
Kappen, 1995). At the same time, transnational actors may also pursue goals that conform with
the interests of formal actors of international relations like states or international organisations
that they are affiliated with (Risse, 2007: 260).
Transnationalism is of course a defining feature of Europarties inside the EU (Van Hecke,
2010), and the same principle extends beyond EU borders, with Europarties binding together
political parties across national jurisdictions (Chryssogelos, 2017: 259-260; Fonck, 2018: 1306).
As legal entities with a close relationship with EU institutions and ideationally committed to the
broad framework of EU foreign policy goals – regional stability and security, attraction of post-
Soviet  and  Western  Balkan  states  to  the  EU  orbit  countering  rival  geopolitical  influences
(Chryssogelos, 2017: 259) – Europarties can influence the neighbourhood through transnational
channels that complement conventional EU diplomacy (Nitoiu and Sus, 2017: 84). 
But despite the close alignment of Europarty objectives with EU foreign and neighbourhood
policy goals, Europarties can be understood as transnational actors also because they maintain
their distinct goals, priorities and logic of operation (Fonck, 2018: 1306-1307). A key source of
Europarties’ credibility and leverage towards their external partners is their ability to defend and
promote the latter’s interests in Brussels and display partisan allegiance to their partners. While
they  operate  within  the  general  framework  of  EU strategic  interests  and  norms  of  external
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relations, Europarties remain in the final analysis partisan actors engaged in partnerships defined
by adherence to a set of ideological goals and principles. 
Thus, Europarties not only amplify EU influence in the neighbourhood but also serve their
transnational purpose of partisan and ideological allegiance. Despite their formal adherence to
EU goals, Europarties cannot cease to perform their partisan function, because it is precisely
their  ability  to  satisfy  partner  parties’  needs  that  they  consider  as  precondition  for  exerting
leverage and influence over elites in neighbouring countries. In other words, Europarties are in a
dynamic relationship with EU foreign and neighbourhood policy: they are constrained by it but
also use it as a field for the pursuit of goals dictated by their transnational nature (Fonck, 2018:
1309). 
The view of Europarties as networks in the EU political system also has implications for their
external  actorness,  especially  since  EU-neighbourhood  relations  are  increasingly  understood
through the lens of external governance promotion. In this perspective, the EU aims to transpose
norms and practices of policymaking to states in the Balkans and the Eastern Partnership through
transgovernmental  networks  of  experts,  bureaucrats  and  administrators  (Lavenex  and
Schimmelfennig, 2011). Here as well, Europarties’ ability to foster ties with politicians, cadres
and  experts  in  the  neighbourhood  on  the  basis  of  partisan  affinity  also  creates  horizontal
networks  of  norm  and  practice  transference  in  the  area  of  representative  politics,  party
organization,  state-society  relations  etc.  Much  as  inside  the  EU  then,  Europarties  can  be
considered as networks of external EU governance as well (Chryssogelos, 2017).
Bringing these two theoretical threads together, we can begin to understand Europarties in
EU foreign policy as  networks  of  external  EU governance  of  a  partisan-ideological  nature.
Europarties influence, socialise and shape the conduct of political actors in the neighbourhood in
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return for access to the EU policymaking system and opportunities to promote their profile in
Brussels, an important source of EU leverage at a time of weakened credibility of the prospect of
enlargement (Börzel et al, 2017). But despite their close alignment and reference to EU strategic
goals  in  the  Balkans  and  post-Soviet  Eastern  Europe,  Europarties  also  have  a  distinct  self-
conception of interests, priorities and modes of interaction across jurisdictions. This means that,
as self-conscious actors of a transnational partisan character, Europarty priorities and logic of
operation can theoretically come into conflict with EU objectives and norms. As we will see,
such  contradictions  do  indeed  arise,  affecting  the  cohesion  of  EU  policy  towards  its
neighbourhood.
The European People’s Party in Georgia and North Macedonia 
The centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) is the largest Europarty and has the most
extensive network of associated parties in the EU neighbourhood. The enlargement of the EPP
footprint beyond the borders of the EU is the externalisation of a deliberate strategy of expansion
that  the  EPP  undertook  in  parallel  with  successive  EU  enlargements  since  the  early-1990s
(Martens, 2008). Having established itself as the largest Europarty in the EU by the early-2000s,
the EPP became an attractive partner for elites in neighbouring countries. 
Foreign  policy  considerations  have  not  been  unimportant  in  these  dynamics.  The  EPP
benefits from its very strong positioning on foreign and security policy issues (Chryssogelos,
2015). As heir to the legacy of Christian-democracy, the EPP appears as an obvious partner for
pro-European  parties  in  neighbourhood  countries  whose  societies  still  exhibit  a  socially
conservative outlook. At the same time, the Atlanticism of the EPP matches the priorities of pro-
Western  parties  in  countries  with  pressing  questions  of  territorial  integrity  vis-à-vis  Russia.
These  considerations,  and  especially  a  candidate  party’s  European  orientation,  are  the  most
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important  objectives  of  EPP  fact-finding  missions  to  establish  ties  with  parties  in  the
neighbourhood7. Here, the goals of the EPP as a transnational ideological actor work in tandem
with dynamics of EU conditionality and the goals of EU foreign policy. 
At the same time, the programmatic and organisational streamlining that the EPP expects
from  its  associated  parties  matches  the  external  normative  agenda  of  the  EU:  projecting
European standards of party democracy helps stabilise weak and fickle party systems and creates
a better environment for other reforms in neighbouring countries’ states and institutions to take
place (Chryssogelos, 2017: 263). This is particularly important for countries where party politics
are weakly institutionalised and parties are often captured by oligarchic interests, as is the case in
post-Soviet states (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010: 61; Hale, 2006: 309; for a good overview, see
Bader, 2010: 75-107). In the Western Balkans on the other hand party politics are riven by the
legacies of ethnic conflicts (Stojić, 2017), while in this region as well problems with corruption
and private capture are also present (Stojarova and Emerson, 2013).
I examine the activities of the EPP as a network of external EU governance of a partisan-
ideological nature in Georgia and North Macedonia. These two cases present appropriate degrees
of similarity and difference to comparatively examine the role of a Europarty as actor of EU
external relations. Both countries are in the EU neighbourhood, but while North Macedonia is
subject to the enlargement perspective that the EU has extended to the West Balkans, as member
of the Eastern Partnership Georgia angles for closer relations to the EU without a formal promise
of accession.  Both countries have fairly stable party politics in comparison to their neighbours.
Georgia underwent in 2012-13 the first peaceful change of government in the post-Soviet world,
while North Macedonia’s party system is dominated by two parties competing along left-right
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ideological  lines.  Also,  despite  their  deep  polarization,  major  parties  in  both  countries  are
formally committed to their countries’ pro-European orientation.
In terms  of  methodology,  my research  relies  on a  combination  of  analysis  of  secondary
documents (official releases and press reports) and primary research: six interviews with officials
of the EPP in Brussels and of EPP associate parties in Skopje and Tbilisi in the fall of 2018
(complemented by five interviews with Europarty officials conducted in 2013 during a previous
research project where I looked more in depth at the Georgian case), and participant observation
at policy events and meetings of the EPP network over the decade since 2010. The analysis will
first discuss the functioning of the EPP as a network performing functions of socialization, norm
promotion and societal influence in the two countries. Then it will discuss how this function is
both  enhanced  and  complicated  by  the  EPP’s  transnational  partisan  character  as  it  tries  to
reconcile promotion of EU strategic goals with its commitment to political support to partners.
The EPP as Network of External EU Governance
The EPP is associated in Georgia with the United National Movement (UNM) and in North
Macedonia with VMRO-DPMNE. Even though they are not full members of the EPP (a status
reserved for parties from EU member-states), they are involved in the various activities of its
network. Both parties’ leaders are invited to EPP conferences, congresses and summits. Their
representatives take part in some EPP committee and working group sessions and participate in
training seminars and policy events organised by the EPP or associated political foundations (e.g.
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation)8. Representatives of their youth leagues participate in training
events  of  relevant  EPP  associations  (YEPP for  youth  and  EDS for  students)9.  Nationals  of
Georgia and North Macedonia work in EPP headquarters in Brussels. The EPP in turn offers
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support  to  UNM and  VRMO by  disseminating  their  positions  and  assists  in  their  electoral
campaigns by issuing video statements of European centre-right leaders, social media posts etc.
This  outline  of  activities  demonstrates  how  the  externalisation  of  the  EPP  network
complements the usual avenues through which the EU has tried to influence its neighbourhood
(Lavenex  and  Schimmelfennig,  2011;  Schimmelfenning  and  Scholtz,  2008).  The  EPP’s
involving in its network elites, officials and supporters of UNM and VMRO helps socialise them
to European values and expectations of ‘normal’ party politics10. It also contributes to policy and
expertise transference as many of the participants in EPP activities may occupy in the future
positions  in  these  countries’  administration.  Finally,  the  EPP  network  serves  as  a  venue  of
linkage between the EU and politically mobilised sections of societies of Georgia and North
Macedonia.
In Georgia, UNM was founded by Mikhail Saakashvili and came to power in 2003 with an
explicit agenda of modernising Georgia and bringing it closer to the West and away from Russia.
It  joined  the  EPP  in  September  2008,  prompted  by  the  Russian  invasion  of  Georgia
(Chryssogelos,  2017:  267).  After  almost  a  decade  in  power,  in  2012-13  parliamentary  and
presidential elections removed Saakashvili and his allies from all levels of government in the
first  orderly  handover  of  power  in  the  post-Soviet  world.  As  Saakashvili  accused  the  new
government of engaging in political purges and manipulating justice against him, the EPP voiced
his claims in Brussels (EurActiv, 2013). 
For years Saakashvili remained a fixture in EPP events (although recently he has fallen out of
favour of the EPP)11. But UNM continues to highlight its connections with the EPP hoping to
draw political capital and support in its electoral campaigns12. The EPP’s continuing support for
UNM (see e.g. EPP, 2015; 2016) has contributed to the survival of an ex-governing party, an
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extremely rare phenomenon in post-Soviet states where parties usually fizzle out when they lose
access to state resources (Bader, 2010). For UNM politicians its survival was a precondition to
continue  to  draw  on  EPP  support  and  maintain  access  to  EU  leaders  and  policymakers13.
Indirectly,  EPP  involvement  has  assisted  in  consolidating  the  party  system  in  Georgia,  a
development congruent with the EU’s normative agenda of more stable representative politics in
neighbourhood states (Chryssogelos, 2017: 268). 
In North Macedonia, VMRO-DPMNE had been in power since 2006 under the leadership of
Nikola  Gruevski.  Although  in  the  beginning  Gruevski  posed  as  a  pro-European  and  pro-
Atlanticist  reformer  who,  despite  his  party’s  nationalism,  could  be  moderate  on  inter-ethnic
relations,  these  hopes  were  dashed.  Around  the  end  of  his  first  term  in  office,  Gruevski’s
government started to propagate an increasingly aggressive form of nationalism externally while
slowly establishing more authoritarian forms of rule domestically. In early 2015 a wiretapping
scandal threw the country in a major two-year-long political crisis.
Since the two sides of the crisis were associated with different Europarties (EPP and PES),
the  European  Parliament  undertook  to  mediate  between  them.  The  effectiveness  of  this
mediation mission however was undermined by the perceived bias of representatives of the EPP
network (MEPs and Europarty officials)  in  favour of VMRO. Indeed,  VMRO solicited  EPP
support to ‘shield itself  from accusations by the opposition and the international community’
(Fonck, 2018: 1317). What is more, the EPP displayed an impressive commitment to Gruevski
(Euractiv,  2015). Even after  he stepped down as PM in early 2016, EPP actors,  both of the
Europarty and its wider network, vocally supported VMRO in the December 2016 election14.
While  members  of  VMRO’s  liberal  wing had  contacts  with  EU actors,  the  EPP  leadership
refused to meet them while Gruevski was still leading VMRO15.
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The conduct of EPP towards VMRO visibly changed after June 2018 when the new socialist
government in Skopje signed an agreement with Greece resolving the name-issue and opening
the way for (the now officially renamed) North Macedonia to begin accession negotiations with
the EU. The agreement was heartily endorsed by the EU. Suddenly VMRO, that had replaced
Gruevski as leader a few months before, saw its relationship with the EPP freeze, especially after
it organised a boycott of a referendum on the name-deal in September 201816. The EPP now
became interested in the moderate wing of VMRO, inviting its representatives to its conference
in Helsinki in November 2018 and meet EPP-affiliated enlargement commissioner Hahn. 
The fluctuations  in  the EPP’s stance towards VMRO highlight  another  dimension of the
network function of Europarties’ external activities. Gruevski could draw on personal contacts in
the EPP network that he cultivated in more than a decade of participation in EPP activities, not
only with Brussels actors but also national likeminded politicians, especially Hungarian leader
Viktor  Orban.  With  him  removed,  VMRO  became  more  exposed  to  EPP  criticisms  of  its
domestic and foreign policy positions, so much so that some speculate that if Gruevski were still
leading VMRO EPP criticism of its rejection of the name-deal with Greece would have been less
vocal17.  On the  other  hand, the EPP network created opportunities  for  the EU to come into
contact  with  new,  more  accommodating  actors  in  VMRO’s  liberal  wing,  politicians  who
themselves had a long history attending EPP events, youth meetings and training seminars in
Skopje and Brussels18.
The EPP as Transnational Actor of Partisan-Ideological Nature
While the EPP as a network of external governance has been instrumental in incorporating
political  actors  from the  neighbourhood in  processes  of  deliberation,  socialization  and norm
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diffusion  with  the  aim of  transforming  the  conduct  of  party  politics  and  influence  political
developments there,  the EPP as a transnational  actor defined by its credibility as a partisan-
ideological partner has found itself in a delicate relationship with EU priorities in the region. In
both Georgia and North Macedonia, the instincts of the EPP during political crises has been to
stick by its partners, often at significant reputational cost and against the positions of important
national member-parties and of EU priorities in the region.
In Georgia after 2012 the EPP has been a prominent voice of suspicion in Brussels towards
the Georgian Dream coalition that displaced the UNM. As a peaceful electoral change in a post-
Soviet state, Georgian Dream’s victory over the UNM furthered the EU’s preference for more
stable democratic politics in Georgia, especially since the new government kept on the same pro-
Western  route  as  Saakashvili.  But  the  EPP  regardless  voiced  concerns  against  the  new
government,  not  least  because  the  other  two Europarties  –  the  socialist  PES and the  liberal
ALDE – had partners in Georgian Dream and expressed their support for them.
The  Georgian  transfer  of  power  in  2012-13 then  created  a  dynamic  whereby the  EPP’s
function as a transnational partisan actor contradicted goals and priorities of EU foreign policy,
as  well  as  its  own  role  as  an  EU  network  fostering  norms  of  democratic  governance  and
competitive party politics. For example, the EPP complicated the EU granting to Georgia visa
liberalisation,  which it  achieved in 2017, a move many interpreted as way to prop up UNM
against the government in Tbilisi (EPP, 2016). As a Georgian expert not otherwise unfriendly to
the EPP stated, the EPP’s instinctive commitment to UNM hampers the development by the EU
of ‘a broader strategic vision for the region and keeps it from contributing to a stable political
culture in Georgia’19.
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Similar dynamics appeared in the EPP’s relationship with VMRO at the time of the wiretap
scandal. By that point, VMRO had become an embarrassment for the EPP and exposed it to the
criticism of its opponents in Brussels that it contained in its ranks a partner with authoritarian
tendencies (European Western Balkans, 2017). The defence of the EPP was that it was much
better to keep VMRO in the fold and influence its conduct via EPP procedures and vetting20. By
expelling VMRO, the EPP and by extension the EU would lose all leverage over Gruevski at a
time when the frustration of North Macedonia’s accession bid had already weakened the EU’s
influence  in  Skopje  (Fonck,  2018:  1311).  Following  on  this,  an  even  bigger  fear  was  that
expelling VMRO would force it to look for new geopolitical partners altogether, in particular
Russia. 
The VMRO case sheds light on the complex and contradicting dynamics of the relationship
between EU foreign policy priorities and Europarties’ commitments as transnational actors. The
EPP seemed willing to absorb reputation costs and prioritise partisan allegiance over EU goals
during the constitutional crisis in North Macedonia in 2015-17 by sticking by Gruevski. But once
a tangible opportunity arose in 2018 for the name-issue to be resolved and the EU to unlock the
accession  process  of  North Macedonia,  the  EPP prioritised  the  EU’s  strategic  interests  over
partisan solidarity with the VMRO, urging the party to reassess its nationalistic position on the
name-issue lest North Macedonia’s path towards the EU be jeopardised21.
But  EU foreign  policy  goals  may  not  be  the  full  explanation  for  the  EPP’s  reversal  of
position  vis-à-vis  VMRO.  For  some  observers,  the  EPP  started  changing  its  position  and
favouring the liberal wing in VMRO already in March 2017 i.e. well before the name-deal with
Greece but after Gruevski was removed from power22. This showed how an associate party’s
entrenchment  in  governmental  power  helped  it  to  counterbalance  the  EPP’s  clout  precisely
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because it corresponded to the EPP’s logic of operation as a partisan actor sensitive to questions
of office-seeking and political success23. At the same time, as a transnational actor interested in
extending its influence abroad, the EPP considers questions of power (of its members in the EU
as well as of its associates outside of it) essential. This qualifies indeed the degree of leverage
Europarties as EU actors can exert over elites in the neighbourhood (see also Cianciara, 2016;
Richter and Wunsch, 2020).
Conclusions 
Transnational party politics are an overlooked feature of EU external relations. This article
has shown that Europarties can serve as both an amplifier of EU influence in its neighbourhood
and a factor of contradictions and complications in EU external relations. The activities of the
EPP in  Georgia  and  North  Macedonia  showed  that  Europarties  play  an  important  role  as
alternative pathways of EU influence over countries in the neighbourhood, helping to promote
both the EU’s strategic interests and its normative agenda. However, the partisan nature of this
type of transnational politics also means that party-political considerations cut across the conduct
of EU foreign and neighbourhood policy. The article developed the concept of  network of EU
external  governance  of  a  partisan-ideological  character to  capture  the  strengths  and
contradictions of the actorness of Europarties in EU external relations.
As  was  shown,  in  crucial  moments  the  EPP  supported  controversial  politicians  like
Saakashvili  in Georgia and Gruevski in North Macedonia at no small  cost for its reputation.
While the EPP maintains a large degree of leverage over its partners, its partisan and personal
commitments to them may at times run against its support for the strategic goals of the EU.
Solidarity with political friends is a sticky and persistent instinct. As an EPP official put it, the
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mindset can be summarised as: ‘they may be bastards, but they’re our bastards’24. But, as the
conduct  of the EPP towards VMRO showed, there are limits  to this mindset  when core EU
interests come into play and neighbourhood elites lose access to state power. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  important  to  appreciate  the  full  role  of  Europarty  networks  of
deliberation, socialization, linkage and norm and policy transference beneath the level of high
politics  (von dem Berge,  2017).  Throughout  this  period the  EPP has  provided an important
forum for UNM and VMRO cadres to meet EU actors, become socialized in EU norms and be
exposed to European standards of party democracy and democratic governance. The hope is that,
as these young cadres assume leadership roles in the future, these norms will eventually be put
into practice25. EPP support contributed to the institutionalization of the Georgian party system
(however polarized) after the government change of 2012-13, and it may perhaps contribute to
an amelioration of party politics in North Macedonia through fostering a more liberal wing in
VMRO.
The  analysis  has  implications  for  a  variety  of  literatures.  In  the  EU  external  relations
literature,  it calls for a broader understanding of the role of external networks of governance,
calling for a closer look not only at administrative and expert networks but also partisan and
ideological ones. On Europarties, it highlights the analytical distinction between Europarties as
entities  in  Brussels  with  their  own  agenda  and  interests,  and  Europarties  as  networks
(Bressanelli,  2014;  Klüver  and  Rodon,  2013).  The  article  also  extends  the  literature  on  the
relationship  between Europarties  and non-EU partners.  The analysis  broadly agrees  with the
reservations of Shagina (2017) and Stojić (2017), but shows that conceptualizing Europarties as
networks of EU external relations means both appreciating the positive impact they can have
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below the high-politics level and understanding better when and why they may complicate the
conduct of EU foreign policy. 
Finally,  the  analysis  speaks  to  a  growing  literature  examining  critically  the  relationship
between Europarties and democracy in the EU (Kelemen, 2017) that has worrying analogies with
developments in the neighbourhood, as admitted by Europarty and national party officials from
the region26. This falls within a broader debate about the EU’s ability to truly foster change in the
neighbourhood (Börzel et al, 2017) as elites there have become more adept at using association
with the EU to their benefit (Cianciara, 2016; Richter and Wunsch, 2020; Shagina, 2017). 
These are valid criticisms, and the analysis here has shown how they play out in Europarties’
transnational activities.  But the article has also shown that these negative trends coexist with
Europarties’ ability under certain conditions to influence developments and their continuous role
as  networks  that  contribute,  however  slowly,  to  more  democratic  party  politics  in  the  EU
neighbourhood. The concept of external network of partisan-ideological character thus locates
the activities of Europarties in the framework of post-enlargement EU foreign policy,  putting
their  role  in  a  much  different  light  from  the  one  of  internal  EU  politics  and  highlighting
dimensions of EU engagement  with the neighbourhood that are until  today understudied and
undertheorized.
Notes
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